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Judgment Proofing, BanL�1ptcy Policy, 
and the Dark Side of Tort Liability 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.* 
One need not be an astute student of the law of obligations to appreciate 
Professor Schwarcz's comprehensive rebuttal of Professor LoPucki's recent 
articles on judgment proofing.t Schwarcz argues compellingly that judgment 
proofing is not likely to occur in arm's length contexts. Although judgment 
proofing may be more likely in non-arm's length situations, he also demon­
strates persuasively that current doctrine is up to the task without the need for 
additional regulation. 
Schwarcz correctly observes that the principal potential victims of judg­
ment proofing are involuntary (i.e., tort) creditors of business debtors.2 
However, neither Schwarcz nor LoPucki gives much attention to the signifi­
cance of the underlying policies or characteristics of tort liability to the mat­
ter of judgment proofing.J My observations address tort claims in this con­
text. I shall not devote my brief allotted space to a broad critique of the 
Schwarcz-LoPucki dialogue. Instead, this essay outlines a different path for 
future scholarship and policy debates. In particular, that path must pay at­
tention to both the nature and effects of tort liability. 
Schwarcz and LoPucki both proceed on the implicit assumption that tort 
claimants, even claimants against insolvent (judgment proof) debtors, should 
be paid. Addressing debtors that cannot pay, however, inevitably implicates 
bankruptcy policy. In my view, the purpose of the bankruptcy system should 
be the enforcement of legal rights against a debtor in financial distress. 
Bankruptcy is a branch of civil procedure-a judicial process in which legal 
rights and entitlements are determined and remedies are provided.4 Accord-
* Interim Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
I. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998); James J. White, 
Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki 's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE 
L.J.1363 (1998). 
2. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 4-5 & nn.13-14. 
3. This is not necessarily a criticism; neither set out to examine tort law. 
4. "Bankruptcy is civil procedure-no less but absolutely no more." Charles W. Mooney, Jr., 
Hosing Down Senior Claims with a Quicker and Dirtier Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. I 153, 1158 
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ingly, the creation and attributes of the legal rights that bankruptcy should 
enforce are detem1ined primarily by nonbankruptcy state and federal law. 
These rights include property rights, claims in contract and tort, governmen­
tal interests such as claims for taxes and fines, zoning restrictions, licensing 
requirements, and most other legal relationships with a debtor, such as the 
interests of the debtor's shareholders, partners, and employees. As a first 
principle, then, Schwarcz' s and LoPucki 's intuitions are correct insofar as 
tort claimants have legally enforceable claims. 
When a debtor is insolvent it is sometimes appropriate to apply different 
rules in the interest of maximizing the recoveries of those with legal entitle­
ments or to achieve other normatively desirable goals. One set of insol­
vency-based rule changes is the body of doctrine generally known as 
"fraudulent transfer." Under both Bankruptcy Code section 548 and the Uni­
form Fraudulent Transfer Act (and the earlier Uniform Fraudulent Convey­
ance Act), obligations incurred for less than "reasonably equivalent value" 
("fair consideration," under the earlier act) are avoidable if they are incurred 
while the debtor is insolvents A voidance based on the inadequacy of value, 
as opposed to actual fraudulent intent, is often called "constructive" fraud. 
Although there may be no consensus on the precise normative basis for 
avoiding transfers of property or the incurrence of obligations by an insol­
vent debtor for less than reasonably equivalent value, there does seem to be a 
general consensus that fraudulent transfer law, including the constructive 
fraud rules, should be retained.6 
Note that the constructive fraud doctrine appears to catch some purely 
innocent behavior that has the effect of damaging an insolvent debtor's 
creditors (by taking away assets or by giving rise to a competing obligation).? 
( 1994) (commenting on Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured 
Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 (1994)). 
5. I I  U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i) (1993 & Supp. 1999); UNJF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 
5(a) (1984); UNJF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 (1918). There are triggers other than in­
solvency that also will invoke fraudulent transfer doctrine. See. e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II) 
( 1993 & Supp. 1999) (debtor "engaged . .. or . . .  about to engage in business or a transaction, for 
which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital"); I I  U.S.C. § 
548(a)( l )(B)(ii)(III) (1993 & Supp. 1999) (debtor "intended to incur . . .  debts that would be beyond 
the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured"). References in this essay to "insolvent" or "in­
solvency" are intended to embrace these other triggers as well. 
6. For example, David Carlson questioned the economic efficiency of fraudulent transfer law, 
but concluded nonetheless that the doctrine is supportable on non-efficiency-based normative 
grounds-it is wrong to take assets away from creditors and give them to others. See David Gray 
Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Ef icient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643 (1987). Some, how­
ever, have questioned the wisdom of applying fraudulent transfer law in specific contexts. See, e.g., 
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 
V AND. L. REV. 829 (1985). 
7. "The most important aspect of the original 1915 statute [the Uniform Fraudulent Convey­
ance Act] was that it codified in fraudulent conveyance law a concept usually called 'constructive 
fraud ' or 'presumptive fraud. ' Both terms are misnomers because the new concept permitted a 
creditor to avoid-to set aside-a transfer even though the debtor was entirely innocent of any 
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Stated otherwise, under constructive fraud doctrine a creditor normally 
should not be allowed to claim an amount that is substantially greater than 
the value that the creditor has contributed to the debtor. 
Many-possibly most-tort claims incurred by an insolvent tortfeasor 
appear to meet the test for avoidability under fraudulent transfer law. When 
the debtor's tort liability appears it is unaccompanied by any corresponding 
asset.8 Had counsel for the debtors and non-tort creditors pursued this path, 
the results in huge bankruptcies involving mass tort claims in recent years 
might have been radically different. Forewarned of this theory, counsel for 
debtors and non-tort creditors who fail to pursue it in the future may act at 
their peril.9 On the other hand, arguments typically are not made that tort 
claims, as opposed to contractual claims, may be avoidable on a fraudulent 
transfer theory. This is surprising, especially because Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 548 is so compellingly clear.Jo 
· 
There is a second aspect of tort liability that may bear on how seriously 
we take the potential for judgment proofing. Simply put, there is no consen­
sus on why tort liability exists or what tort law is about. The principal ra­
tionales are deterrence, justice, and compensation.11 If critics are correct that 
fraudulent intent. The statute defined circumstances in which the transfer was regarded as unfairly 
disadvantageous to the debtor 's creditors, regardless of intent. . . .  " ELIZABETH WARREN & ]A Y 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 162 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
8. The analysis will not always be so simple, however. For example, one injured by a defec­
tive product may have paid the price for the product, thereby giving some value to the debtor. Also, 
difficult questions may arise as to when a tort obligation is incurred. 
9. Steven Harris and I warned of this possibility in a footnote in a 1994 article. See Steven L. 
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors· 
Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2066 n. l 34 (1994). 
10. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act may be less clear, as its drafters apparently may not 
have thought about tort claims as obligations affected by the statute. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT§ 6(5) (1984) (providing the time when an obligation is incurred if the obligation is 
"oral" or "evidenced by a writing," perhaps suggesting that the drafters were not thinking of tort 
claims as obligations). 
Note that the idea of subordinating tort claims in bankruptcy flies against arguments that con­
tract claims-even secured contract claims-should be subordinated to tort claims in bankruptcy. 
See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 
1646-1650 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor 's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 
1908-14 (1994). Avoiding tort claims under fraudulent transfer law would exacerbate the negative 
externalities considered by Leebron and LoPucki, to be sure. But honoring many types of tort 
claims likewise does substantial violence to the egalitarian (and other) goals of fraudulent transfer 
law. This violence should not be ignored. Perhaps it is time for torts scholars and bankruptcy 
scholars to join forces in exploring how to rationalize competing interests and norms. 
II. See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW (1993); Stephen R. Perry, 
Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David Owen, ed. 
1995). For a brief critique of the deterrence theory, see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., 
Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security 
Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1366-68 (1997). 
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deterrence is a weak justification for tort liability, 12 deterrence must be an 
even weaker rationale in the case of an insolvent debtor. The debtor has no 
equity to lose! Moreover, inasmuch as fraudulent transfer doctrine will be 
invoked only in cases of insolvent debtors, application of that doctrine to tort 
liabilities may not present an unreasonable disruption of justice- and com­
pensation-based conceptions of tort law. This is not the place to analyze 
fully tort theory or the normative comparisons between contract liabilities 
and tort liabilities. But if judgment proofing against tort liability is a con­
cern, the nature of that liability cannot be ignored. 
Finally, the wealth effects of tort law must be considered. Schwarcz ar­
gues against radical restrictions or regulatory responses to judgment proofing 
concerns which could "indiscriminately restrict the value creation-'wealth, 
jobs, incomes, and new products for large numbers of people'-that comes 
with business and financial innovation."I3 The contours of tort law itself also 
may be restricting the creation of wealth. As we know it in the United 
States, tort law is wasteful and in general poorly compensates some victims 
while drastically overcompensating others (and rewarding their lawyers). 
Few would doubt that as a society we should provide for those who have 
been injured. But that position does not require a defense of current doc­
trine.14 
The relationship between tort law and fraudulent transfer law is an im­
portant, albeit largely unnoticed, aspect of how tort claims-including mass 
torts-are dealt with in bankruptcy. This dark side of tort liability is its 
negative impact on the other creditors of an insolvent tortfeasor. It seems 
clear enough that a new debate should emerge about the effects of tort claims 
when viewed through the goals underlying tort law, fraudulent transfer law, 
and ban.lcruptcy policy. 
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 3-24 
(1989). 
13. Schwarcz, supra note I, at 53 (citing Paul Craig Roberts, Who Did More for Mankind, 
Mother Teresa or Mike Milken?, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1998, at 28). 
14. Professor Sugarman launched one of the most trenchant critiques of current doctrine and 
its commonly-asserted justifications. In its place he proposed an alternative compensation and 
accident-reduction scheme. See SUGARMAN, supra note 12. 
